By Laura Muchowiecka

Thái Hà dịch

The International Student Journal,

Vol 5, No 06, 2013. TN 2014

Within a short span of time, immigration has become one of the major issues in the field of European politics and social discourse questioning the status quo of such conceptions as citizenship, nationhood and community cohesion. Migration within the borders of the European Union and above all external immigration has led to a phenomenon described as multiculturalism. As Elliot and Lemert suggest, the idea of multiculturalism, which has been recently proclaimed as a new model of not only modern neoliberal states such as Canada, Australia or the United States but also of countries in the Old Continent like France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom or Germany, acquires increasingly less public support. The support, if it existed at all, has turned into official and widespread sentiments of antipathy towards both some immigration groups and ethnic minorities as such and towards multiculturalism as an ideology of a political strategy in particular. It seems even that the idea has become a scapegoat of several social problems like segregation, poverty, increase in crime rate and unemployment, extremism, terrorist attacks, to mention but a few accusations.

“Much like other irritating subjects of the times – postmodernism, globalization, terrorism, among others – the very idea of multiculturalism, the ideology, disturbs out of proportion to what in fact it may be. The reality is that the world in which many people suppose they are living is actually plural ... Yet, strangely, in a time like the one prevailing since the 1990s when a growing number of people began to profess the multicultural as a way of thinking about the worlds, their professions are often greeted with dismay.”1

The core questions which this thesis will seek to answer refer to those objections. Are those accusations justified and if so, in what way? What are the most often mentioned social anxieties and concerns about immigrants and changes which their arrival has brought about? What have been the responses of the authorities and governments to the permanent settlement of a variety of immigrant flows? To address these problems, first of all I shall have a look at the roots and examine how it happened that some Western societies have become so ethnically diverse, what the main groups of immigrants are and how well they have integrated into host societies. And finally: is it justified to speak of a crisis or even fall of multiculturalism?

The countries which have been chosen for the analysis are the United Kingdom and Germany. Since the end of World War II they have both been destination countries of different migration influxes. This thesis is divided into two chapters in which both countries are described following a similar pattern: the first subchapters deal with the history of immigration and immigration policies, next a description of integration of people with an immigration background is presented, then the overview of the topics of main debates on the issue of immigration and multiculturalism is given. In order to understand the meaning of the issues dealt with in this dissertation, it is crucial to provide a theoretical background and explain the term multiculturalism.

What is multiculturalism?

“Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.”2

These words of British Prime Minister David Cameron were a part of his speech delivered at Munich Security Conference in February 2011. His criticism of a longstanding multicultural policy stirred out a public debate on its supposed crisis or even failure. His critical remarks were also referred to an often-cited statement of German Chancellor Angela Merkel of October 2010. She set out her doubts on multiculturalism in a less subtle way, claiming the country's attempts to create a multicultural society have “utterly failed.” They are just two out of the growing number of European leaders who have come to the similar conclusion on the immigrant minorities and their alleged unsuccessful accommodation into European societies.3

It is thus undoubted that multiculturalism has become a fraught issue in European politics in recent years. It has also been reflected in the academic discourse. Casting an eye on some recent scholar titles on the issue such as: The Multiculturalism Backlash, The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights, Crisis and new challenges? ,Recited truths: the contours of multicultural crisis, Rethinking multiculturalism – is enough to agree that the topic is controversial among scholars, too. What three decades ago was viewed as a solution to some social and economic problems and a glorious continuation of human rights movements has now been questioned by growing numbers of people. The reasons of this transformation of the way it is perceived are complex. But before the main ‘allegations’ towards multiculturalism in Great Britain and Germany are be presented, the term multiculturalism needs to be addressed.

Part of the difficulty of multiculturalism is that its meaning is ambiguous and flexible. As Charles W. Mills writes, it is a “conceptual grab bag” of several issues related to culture, race and identity of modern Western plural societies.4In describing this term I will refer to an approach of Kenan Malik, an English writer, lecturer and author of a recently published book Strange Fruit: Why Both Sides Are Wrong in the Race Debate. He argues that the misunderstandings over multiculturalism lie in the fact that the term has two different meanings which are rarely distinguished. First, it refers to certain state responses to such diversity which aim at managing it. Second, it stands for the ‘lived experience of multiculturalism’ – the factual changes which have occurred in some Western countries that have resulted in more ethnic and cultural diversity. Those two aspects are also called a descriptive and a normative level of multiculturalism.5 The ‘crisis’ or the ‘fall’ of multiculturalism is sometimes referred to the first and sometimes to the latter meaning. In the above-mentioned remarks of Cameron and Merkel, both politicians questioned multiculturalism in its normative sense (as “a doctrine,” a policy which is based on the philosophy of multiculturalism). However, some of the criticism aims at multiculturalism as a state of being of today’s diverse populations. These are mainly, but not exclusively, right-wing circles which are strictly against immigration and immigrants in general, and Muslims in particular.

Multiculturalism in a normative sense is characterized as “a feel-good celebration of ethnocultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions . . . that exist in a multi-ethnic society.”6 In its centre lies the affirmative concept of recognition and mutual respect towards each community and their unique values that make up a society. Multiculturalism is supposed to challenge earlier ethnic and racial hierarchies as it supports the belief that there is no better and worse culture – and none of them have the right to dominate other.7 In practise, multiculturalism involves many different measures which do not consist of one set of policies. The measures vary in each country but generally some main practices and rules can be distinguish, such as: public recognition (support for ethnic minority organizations), educational recognition (including diverse cultures’ knowledge in school curricula and establishing state and private schools for minorities), legal recognition (protection from discrimination and allowing some cultural exceptions to laws), religious recognition (permission and support for cultivation of minorities’ religious rites regarding places of worship, time off work for main religious holidays).8

In a descriptive meaning of multiculturalism it seems to be very close to a term of ‘plural society’. Some even argue that the rhetoric of multiculturalism should be reduced to not that controversial term of pluralism.9 Therefore, some definitions of a plural society can also refer to multiculturalism. One of them will be used in this thesis as the most apt and rich description of the discussed issue. Multicultural society is hence a society which is

“a medley of peoples ... for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit.”10

Remarkably, this definition was coined by John S. Furnivall to describe Burma, one of former British colonies. After half of a century this picture is relevant in case of post-colonial countries such as Great Britain or France. The direction of the migrant flows has reversed. While earlier there were Europeans who arrived as foreigners, now there are citizens of post-colonial regions who immigrate to the countries of their former colonialists.

One can also say that this descriptive understanding of multiculturalism as characteristic of societies in which different communities live ‘side by side but separately’ is a result of the normative dimension. In other words, certain policies (or lack of them) encouraged immigrant groups to stay among themselves and not to view themselves as a part of a host society. Great Britain and Germany are called multicultural societies, though their roads have been quite different both in terms of immigration inflows and policies. To see why multiculturalism as a “liberal tolerance” reflected in policies has been recently questioned, we only need to look at the experience of both countries. They will be discussed in more detail in the main part of this thesis, here short presentations will be provided, the aim of which is to answer the question: what have been the roads to multiculturalism of Britain and Germany.

Three decades ago the UK was a different place than it is today. Racism was vicious and widespread. Physical attacks on immigrants from such post-colonial areas as Asia and the Caribbean were common. Workplace discrimination and inequality was endemic. Police brutality towards ethnic minorities was well known. It all caused increasing anger and frustration which resulted in a series of riots that took place in London, Liverpool, Bristol, Brixton and other cities in the late 70s and early 80s. Local authorities recognized this situation as a public menace and a threat to social order and stability. In this context the policies of multiculturalism were launched. They involved set of different strategies of equality such as establishing race relation units or funding minority organisation. Multiculturalism was introduced to school curricula as a programme of giving the opportunity of teaching children other cultures’ markers such as clothing, cuisine or music (which was later criticised as superficial “3S” syndrome: ‘saris, samosas and steel drums’).11 The multicultural polices did not mean to help ethnic minorities develop British identity or adopt the norms and traditions of the country. They were rather giving them the right to cultivate their own identities, the histories of countries of their origin and pursuing their own lifestyle. Their differences were even emphasised and reconfirmed. The so-called leaders of their communities were treated as representatives of their communities – although they were often of conservative views. More progressive movements which were also present were not seen as representative. Muslims were commonly more associated with radicals than with secularists – and it has not changed much. In this way, multicultural policies, which emerged as an opposition to unjust racial inequalities, promoted diversity that paradoxically confirmed ethnic minorities as being ‘others’ rather than a part of ‘Britishness’. It contributed to creating more radical sentiments among Muslims which in some way led to incidents like riots among Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities in three northern cities in 2001 and to London bombings in 2005. Multiculturalism is supposed to be a factor which created a space for such radicalisation of minorities and, coming back to the statement of Cameron, “encouraged different cultures to live separate lives,” which he blames for fostering extremist ideologies.

Germany’s response toward post-war immigrants was different. Unlike Britain, Germany’s main immigrant flows were not the result of decolonization but of labour shortages which the country faced in post-war decades. The foreign manpower was massively recruited from several countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, and later Turkey. Both workers and the receiving country treated it in terms of a short time migration – therefore they were meaningfully called: Gastarbeiter, guest workers. However, many of them did not return and as such they established ethnic minorities in the country which regarded itself as a country of no immigration. Germany has not become a multicultural society by means of any ‘multicultural policies’ like Britain, but due to lack of any solid policies on minorities. The Turks and other immigrants were allowed to stay but were regarded as foreigners who have the right to keep their own culture as long as they do not cause problems. As a result, they did not get encouraged to integrate but became isolated from the mainstream society. In Germany, multiculturalism was not deliberate, it was rather an outcome of denial of the right to citizenship by immigrants. It can be argued that against this background of lack of multicultural strategy, the remark of Merkel of the failure of “multikulti” sounds ironical.12

Part I: Germany

In the centre of German nationhood traits primarily lies the idea of common descent: Germanness has been understood as a matter of blood.13 Thus, the settlement of migrants from other ethnic groups after World War II brought about huge public concerns. The main pattern of migration that laid down the foundation of “multikulti” of today’s German society was linked to economy. Industrialization and the fast economic growth in the post-war decades created a huge demand for workers, which resulted in guest worker policies. Guest workers were supposed to return to their countries of origin and Germany was intended to stay a mono-ethnic country as it regarded itself before. However, the foreigners not only stayed but also brought their families to Germany. In this way, Germany has been recently been confronted with the demand of the concept of the liberal modern state to reformulate its idea of citizenship based so far on descent. In other words, Germany had to admit that because it is a country of immigration, one should be allowed to be a German even without German roots. Although multiculturalism has never had fully public endorsement and has recently been even accused of failure, as has been mentioned in the introduction, the current governmental move is towards explicit policy of integration and recognition of minorities.

This chapter describes the challenging process of Germany becoming an ethnically diverse society and largely refers to controversy stirred over it. It consists of three subchapters. The first one addresses the history of migration to Germany after World War II focusing on main immigration groups and the public attitudes towards them. The second presents the process of changing assimilation policies in Germany and integration of population with a migration background into German educational and economic sphere. The third one is devoted to the social discourse on immigrants and their impact on the German society. It identifies the most crucial concerns with regard to immigrants and discusses them against the background of statistic data and governmental standpoints.

1.1. The history of migration to Germany after World War II: how Germany became a multicultural society

As the number of foreigners in Germany has been gradually increasing since the beginning of the 1950s, Germany has become one of the most important destination countries in Europe for immigrants. In 2011 the number of foreigners reached 6.93 million and the number of ‘people with an immigration background’ (Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund) was 15,7 million in 2010, which means that nearly every fifth person living in Germany has some foreign roots.14 Turks, Italians and Poles belong to the biggest immigration groups.15 In order to understand how such state of affairs came about, the history of migration to Germany needs to be pictured.

After World War II various groups of immigrants arrived, among which the largest ones were: (1) ethnic German from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Spätaussiedler), (2) the so called guest workers (Gastarbeiter) and their families, (3) asylum seekers and war refugees, and finally (4) EU citizens. Each of those channels was notably different. This chapter provides a description of the processes of influxes of the above stated groups as well as their societal consequences and integration peculiarities.

Returning to an unknown home: German refugees and late ethnic German repatriates (Spätaussiedler)

Part 2: The United Kingdom

In the debate on immigration to the United Kingdom it is often stated that until the second half of 20th century the British society was homogenous and its experience of cultural diversity is therefore a new phenomenon. This notion is based on a false conception of the UK as a state of one ethnicity group. In fact, Britain has always been diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity and culture. As professor Bernard Crick notes, “for a long time the UK has been a multicultural state composed of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and also a multicultural society . . . made up of diverse range of cultures and identities.”76 From the earliest times different ethnic groups settled in the UK over the centuries: Celts, Normans, Vikings, Huguenots, and Jews, to name only few of them.77

Since World War II there has been another wave of arrivals commonly called post-colonial or Commonwealth immigration. This immigration set, although not the biggest in numbers, has been on governmental agenda and a vital part of public debate throughout the last decades. It raises both concerns and hopes in the context of British multicultural society and its future.

This chapter of the thesis is devoted to socio-political processes that followed post-colonial migration to the UK. Just like the first part, it is divided into three subchapters. The first one provides an overview of the British immigration history in the second half of the 20th century and changing social sentiments towards the migrants as well as core legislations which were launched in order to regulate immigration and racial relations during this period. The second chapter refers to assimilation policies and segregation problems of the contemporary British society with the focus on two aspects of structural integration: education and economy. The last chapter presents analysis of the British media and political debates on the issue of multiculturalism and immigration based on the main keywords and dilemmas raised in the discussions. The concluding remarks refer to the question of changing patterns of the British national identity in the face of increasing ethnic diversity of the UK. The aim of all three chapters is to provide the overview of the issue of British multiculturalism and integration-related concerns based on the three dimensions such as: (1) a historical background, (2) statistic data of ethnic minorities and migration processes and, above all, (3) public debates in reference to press releases, public opinion surveys and institutional reports.

2.1. Post-colonial immigration and immigration policies in the United Kingdom

The history of the post-war immigration to Great Britain resembles Germany’s in one way: both countries have been showing a reluctant attitude towards massive newcomers. The newcomers have not been welcomed – although in different circumstances. However, British immigration restrictions had another focus. Its immigration policy has been determined by the fact of the downfall of its Empire.78 Thus, what shaped the trends of immigration over the decades following World War II was mainly the progressively restricted influx of citizens of the former British colonies. Of course it does not mean that non-colonial immigration did not take place, but it was post-colonial immigration which had the largest scale and influence on the changes of the British society. Great Britain, just like Germany, has been undergoing the immigration processes which have transformed allegedly a homogenous, nation-state with the non-white population of some 3 000 people at the end of World War II into a multicultural, diverse society with over 7 million foreign-born residents at the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter is intended to provide a brief overview of the history of immigration and British immigration policies after World War II but also to present the society of modern Britain and its socio-political issues are linked to the immigration processes described here.

Policy before 1962: Laying down the foundations for multiculturalism

It all started in 1948, when the British Nationality Act was passed. The legislation guaranteed the right of entry in Great Britain to all citizens of the Commonwealth. Since then 800 million people living in the territories covering a quarter of the Earth’s land surface could enter and settle in the UK without any restriction. It changed remarkably the direction of the migration in the British Empire – the UK, like many other European countries, was the society of emigration throughout the centuries. Now, the pattern was reversed: the UK opened entirely its doors and became the economically attractive destination country. At that stage the consequences of immigration were not taken into account – the Act was simply a way of maintaining the status quo of the British Empire and its citizens and this included not only inhabitants of the UK but also all British colonies subjected to the Queen.79

Over the following 14 years, until the next legislation known as the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, Britain had one of the most liberal migration policies in the world. How, then, can the notion of a UK as a reluctant country of immigration be justified? This can be explained if we consider the circumstances of the liberal policy. It was neither motivated by the openness to the fellow-citizens nor by the post-war labour market shortages (contrary to the common belief), because the UK’s source of foreign workers was Europe.80 One of the largest labour schemes was the European Volunteer Worker (EVW), which let some 350 000 Europeans (mainly Poles) come and stay in Britain.81 What is more, EVWs could enter the country’s labour market on the same terms as British workers just after free years of residence. In contrast, the notion of a labour scheme for non-white immigrants was rejected: the Ministry of Labour “ruled out any question of a concerted plan to bring West Indian colonial workers here, pointing out the serious social implications that the introduction of other races into the labour force would have.”82 It is clear that the policy-makers and politicians were not enthusiastic about the non-white immigration and at best passively tolerated it.83 Their decision was dictated rather by political considerations and was a kind of compromise in order to get along with the Old Commonwealth, which was the priority of the foreign affairs.

Irrespectively of the real causes of this legislation, the effect (one could say, the side effect) was the migration of British subjects from around the globe during the 1950s.This was the crucial period in the British immigration history which ensured its multicultural character. The first arrivals were men and women from the British colony of Caribbean islands, mostly Jamaica. Their emigration to the UK was prompted by the weak condition of the Caribbean economy and by the demand for labour which was the cofactor of all immigration waves. Between 1945 and 1959 126 000 Caribbean workers settled in Britain. Other source countries were India and Pakistan: by early 1960 there were up to 100 000 persons of Indian and Pakistani origins in Britain. Many of them found employment in industries with vacancies such as metal manufacture, transport, catering, as well as professional occupations, like in the National Health Service. Britain became also the destination country for people from Malta, Cyprus and China. In those years more than 66 000 immigrants from Malta and Cyprus and 50 000 from China arrived.84

Altogether approximately 500 000 migrants without any relatives in the UK entered the country from 1949 to 1962. It was then that the so-called “coloured” immigration was viewed as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Britain. The unfavourable social moods towards non-whites existed beyond any doubt from beginning and were expressed openly since the late 1950s.Although the colonial migrants did not come as a part of any governmental programme aiming at reducing the labour shortages, they did fill jobs which were not filled by the Britons. Despite of that, and because of the common racial prejudices, they were almost entirely unwanted both by the state and the population. Social surveys of this period show the public opposition of the majority. Alarmed by the hostility towards newcomers (e.g. famous racial riots in Nottingham and London, which were basically attacks on West Indians and their houses in 1958), politicians sought to hinder the influx. For instance the government obliged every Pakistani entering the UK to make a deposit to cover the cost of their return. The media and some politicians described the ‘coloured’ immigration as a ‘national problem’. A former Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, put it this way:

“While one talked always and rightly about the need to avoid discrimination between black and white, it is a simple fact of human nature that for the British people there is a great difference between Australians and New Zealanders, for example, who come of British stock, and people from Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent who were equally subjects of the Queen and entitled to total equality before the law when established here, but who in appearance, habits, religion and culture, were totally different from us.”85

This statement demonstrates the bipolarity of the British post-colonial policy and immigration attitudes: on the one hand there were citizens of the British Empire who were non-white and though legally equal to others, in reality perceived as a threat, and on the other there were “Old Commonwealth” citizens coming back to the UK. The distinction needed to be shifted from the universal concept of citizenship, which was at first granted in Britain generously, towards one of race. Thus, one of the peculiarities of British immigration history is racialization.

Policy after 1962: The conservative era

As a consequence of growing anxiety and anti-immigration sentiments, the Conservative Government rapidly introduced The Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 making citizens of Great Britain whose passports were not issued by the UK Government subject to immigration control. This put an end to the previous legislation. The act required migrants to possess desired professional skills and have a job position before their arrival. The new restriction was justified with three arguments. The “coloured” immigration could cause: firstly, overpopulation, secondly, escalation of unemployment and thirdly, problems of “race relations.”86Indeed, this was a matter of fact that a vast majority of non-white population, typically to minorities from developing countries, was agglomerated in some urban districts with higher unemployment and crime rates.

Britain realized a bit too late that the influx had already changed the population’s proportion – this 14-year long post-war period was enough to ensure British multiculturalism. Rumours of restricting the policy resulted in a double influx in 1961 and 1962. Moreover, the next wave was unavoidable despite the restrictive legislation – family reunifications guaranteed that migration would continue throughout the following decade. Families’ members did not lose their right to enter the country.87 The influx of colonial citizens was more regulated by the state which linked it to demand on the British labour market and its changing political ideology.

In the following years the UK gradually tightened controls on post-colonial immigration. Although the net migration did not decrease due to the above-mentioned law regulating the family reunion, the legislation was increasingly stricter. In 1968 the social anti-migration moods were fuelled by a widely debated speech held by Conservative MP Enoch Powell. The speech, which went down to history as “Rivers of Blood speech,” attacked the Commonwealth immigration. Powell stated that they need to be mad as a nation to be permitting annual inflow of 50 000 dependants. He compared it to watching a nation engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.88His main argument against multi-racial society was based on the supposed English cultural unity and balanced British way of life that could be destroyed by the invading hordes of immigrants who, with their different practices and “tendency to crime,” would never be able to assimilate.89

Following election campaign, in which the Conservative Party promised to increase “strict immigration control,” the next bill was introduced in 1971. The second Commonwealth Immigrant Act aimed at a more effective basis for control: the concept of “partiality.” Now, only the “patrials” had the right to enter the country. Patrials were British citizens who had a grandparent or parent born in the UK. The rest of the citizens were subjected to control. Additionally, the Government established a quota of 1 500 migrants annually.90

In 70s and 80 the main influx sources were from South Asia: India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, from the Caribbean and other Commonwealth countries such as Nigeria, Cyprus and Hong Kong, and also from South Africa and EC member states. Most of the newcomers from the “New Commonwealth” were secondary immigrants: relatives of those who arrived in 50s and early 60s. British immigration policy shifted then towards control of family reunifications: compared to German legislation on its first generation of guest workers, British regulation was ultra-restrictive towards husbands and fiancés – there was much concern of the high rate of bogus marriages and deception. In order to keep the number of issued permits to the minimum, entry-clearance procedures were sophisticated and long-term. Margaret Thatcher was for the reduction of the family reunifications too and urged putting an end to the concession of relatives. During her successful election campaign in 1979 one of her often quoted statements referred to the open concerns about post-colonial immigration: she claimed that “our own people” can be “swamped by the people with a different culture.”91 Under the Thatcher anti-multicultural government the National Curriculum for schools was changed with a stronger emphasis on white British history and a Christian ethos.92

New patterns of immigration

The following decades brought about other immigration inflows, of which the most discussed have been asylum seekers (due to unfavourable social opinion of them) and citizens of the East European countries (due to their high number). In the 90s several groups of refugees found shelter in the UK, among whom were the Vietnamese (24 000), Bosnians and Kosovans (6 500). Between 2000 and 2002 there was a peak of the asylum application: it rose to over 80 000, mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Although the numbers were not high, their arrivals always caused social discontent. Whereas migration of Eastern European Union citizens turned to be far above the official predictions –since 2004, when the government opened labour market to the new so called A8 European states, more than 500 000 workers from eastern UE moved to Britain over the past decade. Almost 70% of them have been Polish citizens.93 It became the largest migrant flow in British history since the post-colonial immigration. Thus, the top free “sender” countries in 2009 were Poland, India and Pakistan.94

2.2. From white imperialism to multiethnic equality

Casting an eye over the second half of the twentieth century, the immigration history in the UK is marked with the concept of “Britishness” which has been reconstructed in order to define social “we” against the non-white foreigners who in fact arrived as citizens of the English Empire. The origins of today’s multiethnic Britain were perplexing and became a turning point in British history, as it has been aptly put by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, a well-known anti-racist commentator on issues relating to immigration:

“White Britons were failed historically by the political elite who did not prepare them for the changes that came after the war – and who still give out mixed messages about whether immigration has been a good thing for this nation. One moment people in Britain were being taught that they were the imperial masters who had the God-given responsibility to civilize the barbarians they controlled – the next minute these black and Asian people were in the work canteen demanding to be treated as equals. White Britons were told that black and Asians immigration was a threat but at the same time they were instructed to treat those already here as equals.”95

Over this period of time “Britishness” has been built around the racial attachment upon a simple notion: “to be white is to belong, and to be black is to be excluded.”96 (This belief has been questioned by more inclusive nationhood conception recently.) Post-war decades were characterised by the decolonizational massive immigration which was one of the main political issues throughout the years. Although there were other immigration flows, not less important in figures, from such regions as Ireland and EC (and later EU), they gained much smaller medial and political attention, as they were not viewed as the arrival of “other” cultures and religions, although they also built up a multicultural society of the UK.

Today’s immigration discourse is to some point less conservative on the racial issues and not that much focused on control, rather on assimilation policy and connected to it “migration management,” a phrase more and more often used by governmental officials. The term of “Britishness” has been also undergoing reconstruction. The immigration policy trend however is still selective: on the one hand encouraging “wanted” economic migrants such as skilled workers and international students and, on the other, restricting the measures of economically undesirable migrants such as asylum-seekers and irregular immigrants.

Assimilation and Segregation

The British policy towards immigrants has been quite different from that in Germany. The UK has a strong tradition of equality resulting in anti-discrimination legislations after World War II, which were passed in order to ensure that ethnic minorities have equal rights and are allowed to cultivate their traditions. For example, Sikh motorcyclists were allowed to wear turban instead of helmets and Muslim policewomen to wear the hijab.97 It was assumed that a hospitable law to migrants would make them more open to the wider community. However, the reality turned out to be more complex: institutional racism was rife and the working class’ hostility was generally widespread. Nevertheless, official governmental approach was based on the concept of diversity (although it did not contradict the tendency to restrict immigration inflow). This could be well summarized by the often-quoted words of the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins from 1966:

“I do not regard it [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a ‘melting pot’, which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman . . . I define integration, therefore, not a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”98

However, there was also a strong opposition towards this progressive-style of legislation, for example in the Trade Unions, and more recently this strategy has been seriously questioned. There has been a feeling that the cost of diversity is a polarized society with communities who chose to live in “ghettos” and refuse to integrate. The shift, therefore, has been made from diversity towards what is called cohesion. For example, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion was formed in 2006 and during the introductory speech of Ruth Kelly, the Secretary of State, declared that: “We have moved from a period of uniform consensus on the value of multiculturalism, to one where we can encourage that debate by questioning whether it is encouraging separateness.”99 Similarly, the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality has argued that multiculturalism led to segregation.100 In this sense, multiculturalism as a heterogeneous society composed of separated communities with no common core values, the statement of crisis of multiculturalism is justified. The shift from diversity to cohesion, however, has not brought any radical change to assimilation policy yet – apart from the obligation of passing of a test on knowledge of British history, language and culture. The test has been recently reshaped with a stronger emphasis on “traditional British history” which is supposed to ensure that applicants possess “patriotic” feelings, as the Home Secretary, Theresa May, explains.101

But one may ask: what are those British values which are so often mentioned as a measure of ‘community cohesion’ and what exactly should the ethnic minorities integrate into? In fact, in a social multidimensional life it is never clear what counts as a full integration. The so called ‘cricket test’ shows how difficult it is to measure the level of assimilation. In the 80s, a Conservative politician, Norman Tebbit, suggested that it can be measured by cricket supporting: minorities cannot be regarded as integrated until they supported England at matches with their own countries. At the beginning of the 21st century David Blunkett, Labour Home Secretary, decided that one key index of integration was speaking English. However, this may sound inadequate in the case of immigrants from former British colonies who possess English knowledge anyway with little or no relation to English culture. Defining British values seems to be problematic too. Tony Blair and Gordon Brown delivered several speeches during which they attempted to lay down core British values. In December 2006 Blaire numerated some main traits, such as: ‘belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all’, ‘solidarity of coming together of peaceful co-existence’. Brown mentioned ‘openness and internationalism’ and ‘pride of national heritage’. Nevertheless, those statements have been questioned too.102Neither of them provides any kind of coherent picture of Britishness with which every citizen would identify, including nationally detached young qualified generation, liberals, socialists, feminists, believers, agnostics and loads of different often opposite to each other worldviews. Why then should minorities be expected to acknowledge those values? What is more, Britain itself has always been divided: Scots have a small attachment to the idea of Britishness and have an antipathy to the English hegemony. Against this background it seems highly difficult if not impossible to create a set of British values which could be a basis for a nationalistic project of civic belonging. Those values appear to be rather common to all liberal democracies.

Structural integration

One of the four dimensions of integration is structural integration. Its main goal is to decrease the differences between immigrants and natives to a minimum in terms of participation in the core institutions of the host society, such as education, economy and politics as well as to ensure that they have an equal access to all of public institutions.

Education

In the UK the educational level of immigrants compared to that of natives differs from the German case. There are also significant differences between immigrant groups. Generally, British male immigrants tend to be better educated than UK-born citizens, especially Black Africans, Indians and Chinese. There are only two groups of migrants who leave full-time education at a younger level than Britons: Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi. However, immigrant women are less educated compared to native women. But there is a significant improvement from the first to the second generation of women in terms of educational attainment. In comparison with Germany, immigrants in Great Britain are much better educated than native population.103 In addition, there has been an increasing trend of immigrants being more and more educated: recent newcomers are more educated than UK citizens and previous immigrants.104

Educational achievements of immigrants’ children present a different picture. Language and communication skills tests among the primary school pupils indicate that immigrant pupils have generally worse results than British. Especially the pupils of Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnicity fall well below the average at all stages of primary education. The most probable reason can be their mother tongue – they do not speak English at home so they are disadvantaged from the very beginning of their educational career.105 Afro-Caribbean do badly at tests as well – it might be thought that they should not have language problems as their home language is said to be English. In fact, their mother tongue is mostly a local form of English. Therefore they face similar problem as many children from native working class whose home language differs from that spoken at school.106

Recently, one of the hottest topics of public debate on education in the context of immigrants have been Islamic schools. The state supports several thousands of faith schools of which 12 are Muslim schools. This is a part of a broader shift to increase cultural diversity of schooling. It is also an answer to a call for freedom of multicultural education, which has become strongly emphasized since 80s.107 Until now, apart from 14 state supported schools, there are around 700 private Islamic schools called “madrassas.” Although their number is still relatively small, the demand for Islamic Education is growing very fast.108 Parents who chose those schools say that they offer the appropriate environment which encourages pupils to cherish values of their families as well as provide essential knowledge of Muslim culture.

However, the issue causes a lot of social discontent and anxieties as well as raises concerns about the social influence of separate education.109 Some reports suggest that it can develop racial segregation and intensify extremism: “extremism may be more of a problem within some independent schools rather than state-funded schools,” said the report of the Department of Education.110 In this light, the Department of Education launched new regulation requiring promotion of “British values” in all private schools, including independent Muslim faith schools: “These requirements include the promoting of fundamental British values, respecting the civil and criminal law and presenting political issues in a balanced way.”111 The regulation came into force in 2012.

In overall, the schooling of Great Britain is supposed to be quite segregated in terms of ethnicity. A lot of immigrants’ children attend schools with large numbers of both other immigrant pupils and disadvantaged students (i.e. with relatively poor family backgrounds). This is typical for ethnic minorities in all immigrant countries, in the UK there is however the biggest disproportion.112 It creates a sort of a vicious circle: children go to schools where they stay in their ethnic communities without having enough contact with natives and their language. It decreases their opportunity of successful assimilation as it does not help them to build up identification with a broader community than just ethnic minorities which they belong to.

Economical Integration: Labour Market and Earnings

There is a relatively large share of immigrants working in high-skilled jobs in the UK. Nearly 40% of all immigrants work in managerial and professional occupations as well as in skilled trade (the top 3 are Chinese, African Asians and Indians).113 But new immigrants, although they are more educated on average than others, far more often work in manual jobs far. Almost 30% of them find jobs in elementary occupations such as manufacture of food products or domestic personnel (e.g. babysitter, cleaning).114 Consequently, they work usually below their qualifications.

The average wage gap between immigrants and natives in the UK is bigger than that in Germany (although British immigrants are better educated both than German immigrants and British natives). The earnings of Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi are the lowest. By contrast, white immigrants earn similar amounts to UK-born employees.115

As far as employment rate among immigrants is concerned, historically, the gap between them and natives was relatively big and tended to widen even more in economic downturns. Now, there is almost no difference between employment rates of immigrants and UK-born citizens. In 2009, 81% of immigrant men in working age were employed compared to 79% of their UK-born counterparts.116

2.3. British debate on integration

In Germany, political debate was focused on denying the fact of the multicultural character of the country throughout the second half of the twentieth century, whereas in Britain at that time debate was also dominated by antipathy towards ethnic minorities but with particular emphasis on racial issues. However, the past decade brought about a change in the socio-political discourse of both countries.

The change is twofold: on the one hand the need for immigration and as a result for integration has been officially acknowledged, on the other – multicultural society seems increasingly problematic to a significant part of the societies who question the success of the European paradigm of multiculturalism and call attention to its costs. In Great Britain recent debates have therefore shifted away from a concern with race towards issues such as social exclusion and cultural diversity as well as their potential risks. At least three factors influenced this shift: firstly, the diversification of immigration influx, secondly, social migration-related tensions in some British cities and thirdly, concerns over security in relation with terrorist attacks.117

This chapter deals with main topics of public debate on immigration and integration in Britain. The recurring pattern of these debates is the bipolarity of the views presented in different spheres and dimensions. Hence, there are intellectual and academic disputes with the majority perceiving multicultural Britain as a project and a desirable state of being; at the same time there are popular discourses marked mostly with the sceptical attitude towards multicultural concept (apart from the cosmopolitan spheres). Between both narratives there are media debates which, depending on their socio-political profiles, refer either to intellectual disputes or the popular stories and views of conservative political wing as well as official, governmental opinions. The overview provided here attempts to cover all the debates’ spheres, although does not explore them extensively.

Main keywords used in the integration discourse

Do immigrants live in ghettos?

Since the beginning of post-colonial immigration flows, the phenomenon of what is known as ethnic ghettos (in Germany called parallel societies) has been a fact in Great Britain. White population has been living separated to a high degree from ethnic minorities such as black and Asian and recently Polish nationals, who tend to create communities in some large urban areas. For instance, areas in east and south London are inhabited by people of African ethnicity. Hammersmith is a London borough with a high population of Polish migrants and West London is dominated by the Indians, London’s largest non-white ethnic minority group.118As a consequence, lot of Britons leave London and move to the countryside or expensive and more family-friendly suburbs. During the last decade London has lost more than a third of its UK-born residents who were replaced by immigrants.119

The issue of ethnic communities has raised a lot of concerns among the officials. The speech of David Levin, vice-chair of an association of 250 state schools and leading public schools in London, alarmed a widespread media discussion on social exclusion of people living in “ethnic ghettos.” He warned that majority of London’s schools are “sleepwalking into segregation” with classes in some part of the city of almost all black or Asian pupils (e.g. one school to which he refers in East London has 97% pupils of Bangladeshi origin).120Also Prime Minister David Cameron admitted that Britain made an error by allowing ghettos to develop: “We need to have contact. In many of our towns and cities, we have allowed ghettoes to develop . . . It worries me that we have allowed communities to grow up which live 'parallel lives.'”121

Do Muslims refuse to integrate?

In Great Britain, just like in Germany, there have been concerns about the willingness of immigrants, Muslims in particular, to integrate and embrace the national way of life. According to the Global Attitudes Project majority of British citizens (52%) see Muslims as wanting to be distinct from the society and unwilling to adopt the British customs (the same public opinion research shows that the western country where this opinion is most wide-spread is Germany with 71%).122

Some social surveys researching this issue have indeed found this opinion justified. A poll conducted in 2006 for the Telegraph reveals that four out of the ten British Muslims want sharia law to be introduced into parts of the country where believers in Allah are predominant population group. A spokesman of Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, commended on this poll saying that: "It is critically important to ensure that Muslims, and all faiths, feel part of modern British society. Today's survey indicates we still have a long way to go.”123 Moreover, Muslims in the UK have some different values from the majority of the citizens when it comes to the western liberal attitudes – some of which are against British law. For instance, a poll conducted by The Gallop demonstrates that British Muslims are extremely intolerant to homosexuality: 100% of interviewed said they find it unacceptable.124 Confronted with the challenge of “failed diversity,” the government sought to re-orientate the integration policy towards cohesion which could actively promote certain values, including freedom of speech, democracy, equal rights regardless of race, gender or sexuality. During his speech on integration and assimilation at the Munich Security Conference, the Prime Minister mentioned the need for a shift from what was characterized as “the passive tolerance of recent years” to a “much more active muscular liberalism.”125

Are immigrants an opportunity or a burden?

One of the often-stated claims on the issue of immigration is a common belief that immigrants “steal” the jobs from the residents born in the UK and are a burden on social services.

Since 2004, when eight central and eastern European Countries joined the EU and got a free access to the labour market in the UK, estimates of gross migrant flows from the A8 have reached a million. In the context of rising unemployment there have been considerable public concerns that migrant workers were displacing native workers. Different tabloid newspapers and right-wing media have been running stories on how the immigration is badly affecting British employment and blaming open door policy for that. For example, according to the Sun article from 11th January 2012 “more than 160 000 Brits have lost out on a job to an immigrant in the past five years.” 126 Moreover, there is a wide-spread conviction that immigrants live off social benefits: they are said to take council houses, child benefits, free health care and public education etc. Nevertheless, the official data show a different picture. The report issued by The Department for Work and Pensions in 2008 presents analysis which supports the opinion that “the generally poor labour market outcomes of low-skilled natives in the UK do not reflect a lack of available jobs... but rather issues around basic employability skills, incentives and motivation.”127 As far as the case of foreigners “being a burden” to British welfare benefits, a broader view needs to be taken in account. In order to measure a fiscal impact of immigration, one has to compare the cost of services and benefits used by migrants with the financial contribution they make mainly by their income taxes. The estimation provided by The Migration Observatory “suggests that the overall fiscal impact of immigration ...was mostly positive but small.”128

Do we need immigrants?

Another argument that often comes up in the debate on immigrants, both in Germany and in the UK is the sort of “the boat is full” rhetoric. Lots of people ask themselves if their countries really need to let that many immigrants in. In case of Germany there are two main arguments in favour of immigration: one demographical and the other economical. In Britain, however, only the latter is used, immigration as a factor boosting British economy. One it comes to demography, Britons do not worry about population decline as much as Germans, whose fertility rate is said to be the lowest in Europe (in the UK: 1.91, in Germany: 1.41). Nevertheless, the UK owes it to immigrants: according to the ONS report immigrants are is usually reckoned to be responsible for 70% of population growth (partly because of higher birth rates among them). The debate oscillates between two points: first, the UK as a country with too small resources for receiving immigrants and second, as a counterargument, the notion that British economy rests on continued high levels of immigration.

The most recent hot discussion on this topic focused on the so called ‘70 Million Debate’, initiated by the Migration Watch UK – a think-tank calling for reduced immigration – which collected more than 100 000 signatures within one week on an e-petition. The group argues that the increasing annual net immigration at the present level of 250 000 is much too high. If it is not cut, the UK’s population will reach 70 million within the next 23 years (the current number is around 62 million). The petition calls for “all necessary measures” to be taken to ensure the population stays well below 70 million. Nicholas Soames MP, a supporter of the petition argued: “Although immigration was a natural and essential part of an open economy with some benefits, there were pragmatic causes for concern … In the coming 15 years we will have to build, just for new immigrants and their families, the equivalent of eight of the largest cities outside London.”129A survey of early 2012 found that nearly 80% of people in England think the country is overcrowded. According to another research commissioned by US and European think-tanks the majority of Britons are likely to say that there are too many immigrants in the country (around 50%, whereas in Germany 15% of natives are of this opinion).130 The idea of reducing non-EU influx has strong opponents, too. Chris Bryant, shadow immigration minister, said in October 2012 that governmental attempts to cut the numbers of foreigners coming to the UK are simply “ludicrous” and dismissed claims that Britain was overcrowded.131 Additionally, the report of Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford shows that majority of the non-UE immigrants are students (who are less likely to settle in the UK than other immigrants)– reducing their inflow would have a negative impact on the academic field and labour market.132

Multiculturalism after 7/7

Probably nothing else has influenced the multiculturalism debate recently more than the so called London bombings of 7 July 2005, often referred to as 7/7. On that day four Islamic suicide terrorists detonated three bombs in subway trains and one in a bus, leaving 52 people dead and over 700 injured. The attacks which struck Britain were different from the terrorist attack of 9/11 in America in that way that 9/11 has been officially interpreted as an attack of a foreign terrorist group, whereas London bombers were British citizens brought up in the UK.

This fact has led many commentators to blame multiculturalism for it and made politicians revise the policy of multiculturalism. The critique came immediately after the event. William Pfaff, the Observer columnist, was not alone in his standpoint when he concluded that “these British bombers are a consequence of a misguided and catastrophic pursuit of multiculturalism.”133 The report of an independent think-tank Civitas criticised afterwards “hard” multiculturalists who insist that no culture is better than other – in this context a most vital value would be tolerance which does not set any well-balanced boundaries. The report entitled The Poverty of Multiculturalism suggested that multiculturalism fostered segregation and as such contributed to 7/7 attacks:

“The fruits of 30 years of state-endorsed multiculturalism have increased inter-racial tension ... Different ethnicities in the United Kingdom have grown more antagonistic towards each other, each fearing that another camp is getting a bigger slice of the financial pie than they are ... The fact that the London suicide bombers of 7 July and the would-be bombers of 21 July 2005 were born and bred in Britain – and encouraged by the state to be different – illustrates that Hard Multiculturalism has the capacity to be not only divisive, but decidedly lethal.”134

Indeed, there is evidence that British state multiculturalism relied upon the concept of cultural relativity at least in the past. Many critics claim that multicultural policies have been guilty of accepting some unacceptable practises in the name of diversity, for example such as forced marriages. In 1969 the court judgment revoked a care order of a 13-year-old Nigerian girl although she was married to a 26-year-old man on the grounds that this type of marriage was ‘entirely natural’ in Nigeria.135

Moreover, critics state that cultural relativity contributed to radicalisation of Islamic circles. Muslims have suffered from racism and discrimination throughout the decades but governmental responses did not help them enough to build British identity. By regarding them as accepted but still different they rather indirectly encouraged Muslim communities to turn to their more radical leaders. The result has been nurturing an exaggerated sense of victimhood and anger toward ‘the corrupt West’. That has created space for religious extremism which as a consequence has helped transform some young men into terrorists.136

The event has significantly rebound on Muslim minorities, firstly, in the increase in public anti-Muslim sentiments. It is strongly reflected in opinion polls that the bombings contributed to the common picture of Islam as a threatening religion and Muslims as incapable of integration. Secondly, several counter-terrorism measures have been introduced and the so called ‘war on terrorism’ launched after 9/11 has been tightened in Great Britain. A report commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights Commission suggests that anti-terrorist legislation had concentrated especially on Muslims as they were treated as a ‘suspect group’. The results of this study reveal that Muslims in turn had strong perceptions of the impact of counter-terrorism laws and policies on their lives. For example, Muslims experience far more frequent stops at airports during which they are asked private questions concerning, for example “the number of times a day they pray, the names of mosques they attend, their understanding of the term jihad.”137 Other measures related to safety in the streets. In several places across Britain additional nets of surveillance cameras around areas with large Muslim population have been installed. This measure has been criticized for stigmatising people on the basis of on religion. Consequently, a great number of Muslims feel alienated and isolated as being an unjust target of many anti-terrorism measures.

In the opinion of a British journalist and author, Melanie Phillips, “multiculturalism plus radical Islam is an explosive cocktail.”138 What should be emphasised is the word ‘radical’. The tragedy of 7/7 has increased segregation by intensifying a common misconception of radical Islamist as a representative group of Muslim communities in general and the notion of Islam as a radical religion. As Sami Zubaida has pointed out it is misleading to talk about ‘Muslim society’, while there are actually many different communities of Muslims. They exist in a variety of ethnicities and contain a huge spectrum of secularism and religious practices.139 It is also worth noting that there are debates going on in Muslim communities on how to rearrange their identity so that it does not interfere with western liberal cultures and their norms such as gender equality, religious pluralism and tolerance as well as secular democracy.140 It could help then prevent the growth of radical tendencies and Muslim opposition toward the mainstream Western culture, which contributes to terrorist attacks such as London bombings.

Reorientation of the national identity?

The changes of British multi-national population have been reflected in the concept of national identities expressed both by the ethnic minorities and ethnic majority. On the one hand there are ethnic minorities speaking their mother tongues and cultivating their own traditions and customs and cherishing their own culture. Some of them assimilated so well to the natives that they are no longer perceived as “different” but a part of (mostly urban) Britain; and their self-identification is dual. Statistical data show that a vast majority of British Muslims are proud of their British identity and feel British and Muslim at the same time.141 However, some politicians and commentators question it, perhaps on the basis of the traditional concept of the nation which does not include Muslims.142 On the other hand, there are native Britons, some of whom feel uneasy about the pluralisation of their society and attempts of some elites to re-think their identity in order to make it more inclusive. This issue raises different questions which do not have one answer but instead raise strong emotions. As Tariq Modood and John Salt put it:

“[These] emotions can be constructive and inclusive: they can be harnessed to support a shared citizenship and respect for cultural difference in the understanding that just as one can be Scottish and British, so one can be Indian and British or Muslim and British. Yet these emotions can also be sources of intolerance and boundary-drawing... They can also be a source of grievance and confusion.” 143

Conclusions: multicultural society as the clashes of interests

The problem which one can find striking about multiculturalism debates presented in this thesis is the fact that at the heart of modern ethnically diverse societies such as Germany and the United Kingdom lie seemingly irreconcilable clashes of interests of various parties with differing wishes. Social tensions and clashes of different groups are of course an indispensable part of every society, however there can be observed peculiar patterns of interest clashes in regard to multicultural societies. Hence, based on the above provided overview of multicultural histories and debates in these countries, three main interest groups may be distinguished: immigrants, natives and states.

Firstly, there are ethnic minorities and immigrants who have arrived and settled since the post-war decades. Today they make up on average around 10% of German and British population. In both countries majority of them represents non-European traditions, mainly connected to Islam. In a nutshell, their interests refer to equal rights with native citizens. To understand their claims it would be worth mentioning a non-European perspective.

It seems that those who oppose to migration inflows to Europe in general often fall into a trap of West-centrism, a notion of a supposed uniqueness and cultural and political superiority of the West civilisation. This notion argues that democracy, humanism, scientific rationality, freedom and human rights all uniquely belong to the West. They have all emerged as a result of heritage of ancient Greece and Rome, Christianity, Renaissance and the Enlightenment and finally as a fruit of industrial revolution and democratic movements. In fact, this standpoint ignores the profound achievements of other cultures and civilizations, such as for example Chinese, Indian and Turkish cultures (that are largely represented among minorities), which have been far in advance of anything in the West for ages. Thus, ethnic minorities definitely cannot be marginalized or perceived as a threat to European cultural achievements. Immigrants and people with a migration background should have the same right to live in with dignity and to cultivate their own cultural and religious traditions. In terms of human rights, they can also freely create housing communities and get the welfare support in the countries in which they have been allowed to stay. Their cultural practices are equally valuable as culture of host societies as long as they do not violate basic human rights which are internationally recognized.

Secondly, there are native societies with their interests relating to the notion of a homogenous nation. In both Germany and Britain the concept of citizenship has been largely based on nationhood. Additionally, after the World War II there was a widespread misconception of these countries being one-nation state. Cultural pluralism and religious diversity in particular brought by immigrants from other continents have been greeted with increasingly unfavourable public sentiments. Throughout decades there was only a marginal public endorsement of foreign influxes. It is reflected in numerous public researches that majority of citizens feel threatened by the ethnic ghettos and diverse worldviews brought by immigrants, which sometimes seem to be at odds with set of values declared in liberal democracies. Most of the natives find few of the groups unwilling to integrate and become a part of a broad society. In both Germany and Britain, there is a growing recognition that social benefits are unevenly spread, with the advantage of immigration communities. Some more radical circles represented by right wing politicians even argue that they should not belong to their nations as their ethnical roots differ. An example of such political opinions can be British National Party (BNP) in the UK and National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – NPD) in Germany.

But apart from the radical nationalistic movements, some of the social anxieties about the massive immigration seem to be more than just ethnic and religious prejudices. The question remains which practises should be accepted in the name of tolerance and equality and which should be banned as violating human rights. For instance, this dilemma was the centre of a recent lively debate in Germany on Muslim and Jewish ritual practise of male circumcision. Should it be allowed in the name of religious freedom or rather banned as inflicting bodily harm to a child? Besides, it is still unsettled what kind of patriotic attachment and national feelings, if any, should be expected from the immigrants who want to settle and become citizens. Finally, the so called ‘Muslim question’ leaves it inconclusive in what way Islam might be a religion inextricably connected to sharia law which appears to be contrary to democratic secular legislation systems.

Last but not least, there are states of the receiving societies. Germany and UK have their own economic interests and labour market capacity as well as limited welfare system. The states have their types of wanted and unwanted immigrants. The ideal immigrant for the state is a young, highly qualified and skilled in a relevant field individual or, alternatively, an investor with both financial and business capital who is able to create job positions and contribute to the stimulation of the economic growth. Other wanted immigrants are international students as well as scientists and researchers – mostly those of technological fields that can transfer their findings into practise and increase the country’s competitiveness. Additionally, all types of ideal immigrants should be adaptable and culturally close to the host society and ready to return to the countries of their origin as soon as there is no economic need for their skills on the labour market. The least desirable migrants, on the other hand, are asylum-seekers. Majority of asylum applications have been rejected in both countries. They are perceived as the group with the highest risk of being socially dependent with low adaptability and employability skills.

Those three different interest parties have been in a dynamic and multi-faceted relation throughout more than a half of the century. They themselves have been heterogeneous and included a variety of groups and movements. After World War II Britain experienced massive migration inflow from its colonies, while Germany, undergoing a fast economic growth, recruited workforce from abroad. Both countries were socially and politically unprepared for new residents from non-Western areas. They had to grapple with discrimination, racism and inequality in opportunities. The process of formation of the multicultural societies has been strained and resulted in serious anxieties whether the principle of ethnic diversity which has been somewhat unwittingly chosen is safe.

What comes next?

Multiculturalism as an ideology or a political doctrine may be indeed dead, as some commentators and researchers suggest. The movement forward from multiculturalism as the idea of a diverse society in which every community is perceived as equal yet separate is now a fact. Although it appears problematic to clearly reconcile the argument whether multicultural policies contribute to the threat of terrorism, it is undisputed that they have created a space for radicalisation of certain religious minorities. The Salman Rushdie affair also known as The Satanic Verses controversy, the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist, London terrorist bombings and Muhammad cartoons controversy in Denmark have been some of the best recognized flashpoints revealing a series of doubts over the idea of a multicultural Europe. In the case of Germany, on the other hand, ‘multikulti’ has never been an influential ideology and it was lack of immigration recognition that led to multiculturalism in the descriptive sense, that is, a high number of population with an immigration background.

The glory days of multiculturalism as a term are probably over at least in the European context. It would be a mistake to underrate the backlash against multiculturalism and its repercussions. General top-down support for equal opportunities for minorities will likely be maintained. But the ideology of ‘multiculturalism’ has too negative connotations relating to the failure of creating a peaceful ethnically plural society with no enough emphasis on the common cultural basis.

One may ask, how then a common cultural basis is possible in the case of the societies where different parallel cultures exist having apparently little in common. What first comes to mind when a phrase ‘common values’ is addressed against the multicultural background is mostly terms of ‘integration’ (used mostly in Germany) and ‘community cohesion’ (peculiar for Britain). Both concepts imply measures which aim at creating a shared vision and a sense of belonging as well as developing strong and positive relationships between people with different ethnic backgrounds in schools, neighbourhoods and workplace. The measures include such initiatives as bridge-building interreligious projects, workshops for school children from different ethnical profiles organised by the local councils and organisations in the UK. Germany’s policies for immigrants emphasise the advantages of publicly supported language and socio-cultural courses for migrants. As Gary Freeman notices, “there is now a clear trend toward a middling from incorporation – call it integration – that rejects permanent exclusion but neither demands assimilation nor embraces formal multiculturalism.”144The move from multiculturalism is thus not away from it but beyond it into other forms of what may be called ‘interculturalism’.

It seems that the term ‘interculturalism’ has been slowly replacing multiculturalism in many debates on cultural diversity. The key point is that instead of celebrating diversity and emphasizing the differences between cultures represented by minorities and a dominant culture, what is promoted here is encouragement of intercultural dialogue. Within the multiculturalism there was also a space for the dialogue but it was not enough stressed. What differentiates interculturalism from multiculturalism is that it avoids a tendency of treating non-Western cultures as totally separate from the West. Instead, interculturalism recognizes that cultures are historically and contemporarily connected. This conception indirectly relates to the phenomenon of the so-called trans-cultural diffusion, where cultural items such as innovations, religions, values, social institutions are adopted from one culture to another. Even if the connection is small or does not exist there are still shared axiological norms and other parallelisms which have developed independently from each other in different regions. The idea of interculturalism acknowledges the contribution of non-Western cultures as well as postulate understanding of how various conceptions (of freedom, tolerance, social order, rationality etc.) have developed across the globe.

The concept of interculturalism or – as some researchers call it – ‘superdiversity’ is just one possible path of approaching ethnically plural societies – which will likely replace multiculturalism but not necessarily. However, it is clear that in today’s globalised world ethno-cultural diversity is unavoidable. The migration inflows in the second half of the 20th century to Germany and Great Britain, as has been demonstrated, have changed their faces. Despite of the lack of wholly public endorsement to the multiethnic character of their societies, migration was and still is a vital factor shaping their societies and economies. What is more, it will probably be increasingly intense in the future given such phenomena as labour demands of new knowledge economy, decreasing birth rates among native citizens and free labour mobility of the expanding European Union.

By Laura Muchowiecka

The International Student Journal,

*  *  *

mmmmm